We apply a real options approach to analytically characterize the option value of adopting an intermediate technology. We design an asymmetric duopoly model to delineate how the optimal adoption timing of an intermediate technology depends on the embedded upgrading options available to the firm itself and to its future rival. Focusing on diffusions we develop explicit representations demonstrating that the threshold of adopting an intermediate technology depends negatively (positively) on the leader's (follower's) upgrading intensity. For geometric Brownian motion we explicitly characterize the iso-incentive curves keeping the leader's incentives of adopting the intermediate technology invariant.
Introduction
Recently we have witnessed that the European telecommunication industry has made enormous irreversible investments into the mobile UMTS technology. For example, Table 1 shows the price per capita raised from bidding operators for rather similar blocks of spectrum frequencies sold for third generation mobile-phone services in six European countries during year 2000. These spectrum auctions cumulatively raised approximatively US$ 100 billion, which constitutes more than 1.5 per cent of the combined GDP of these countries. Altogether the European telecommunication industry is in the process of completing an investment program with a total volume in the order of magnitude of US$ 300 billion with the intention of bringing together the two hottest technologies at the moment, the mobile phone and the Internet, in the form of third-generation (3G) UMTS-networks. Still the long run forecasts of many experts seem to cast serious doubts on the technological capability as well as the competitiveness of the UMTS technology for the estimated large-scale future demand of datatransmission and internet-based communication. If these perspectives are correct the UMTS technology might represent a fairly temporarily limited phase in the dynamic development of the telecommunications industry. But, why then did the firms invest so heavily in this technology by, for example, offering the spectacular bids we observed in countries like Germany or UK? This study will elaborate the hypothesis that intermediate technologies can be seen as strategic real options, which might play a significantly important role in the competition taking place within the framework of future generations of improved technologies.
Country
Euros The adoption of new technologies typically represents a critical component of firms' investment policies. Adoption decisions tend to be predominantly irreversible and the timing of acquiring a new technology constitutes a key strategic decision for a firm. Premature adoption might often be very risky, but could potentially yield significant comparative advantages. In particular, adoption of a currently available, but still intermediate, technology may generate experience and knowledge necessary for improved access to subsequent generations with upgraded versions of the new technology. In line with the influential investment approach manifested in the extensive books by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) the opportunity of adopting a new uncertain technology can be viewed as representing a real option to the firm. In light of the prospect of successive generations of technologies building on each other, the investment outlays of adoption can be cast as a sequence of embedded options.
A decision to adopt a presently available, possibly intermediate, version of a new technology will have ramifications on the firm's future options. In particular, the value to the firm of upgrading to a new generation of technology can be expressed as that of an option to exchange one risky asset, the incumbent technology, for another risky asset, an upgraded technology with a stochastic arrival time in the future. In Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) we develop an approach based on the Green representation of Markovian functionals for finding the optimal exercise thresholds both of the ordinary real option associated with the updating decision and of the compound real option associated with the incumbent, possibly intermediate, technology. That study also characterizes how the real option values depend on the underlying market uncertainty and on the uncorrelated technological uncertainty regarding future technology improvements. In a related study Grenadier and Weiss (1997) delineate the optimal investment path for adopting successive versions of an innovation. In particular, they examine the impact of various characteristics of technological markets on a firm's decision to follow one of four distinct adoption strategies. However, the focus of Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) as well as Grenadier and Weiss (1997) is restricted to industries in which there is no strategic interaction between the adoption of an incumbent technology and the adoption timings of updated technology versions by firms competing within the framework of future technology generations.
In the present analysis we apply a real options approach to analytically characterize the option value associated with the adoption of an intermediate technology. We formally design an asymmetric duopoly model in order to delineate how the optimal adoption timing of an intermediate technology for an incumbent firm (the leader) depends on the embedded upgrading options available to the firm itself as well as to its future potential rival (the follower). The option value is shown to be increasing as a function of the attractiveness of the embedded upgrading options available to the leader, whereas it is decreasing as a function of the quality of the embedded upgrading options which spill over to the follower. In particular, with our focus on stochastic processes evolving according to a geometric Brownian motion and well-specified restrictions on the type of cash flows, we explicitly characterize the optimal timing of when to adopt an intermediate technology. From this characterization we are able to conclude that the threshold of adopting the intermediate technology depends negatively (positively) on the leader's (follower's) upgrading intensity. Furthermore, we explicitly characterize the iso-incentive curves describing the locus of those upgrading intensities (for the leader and the follower) which keep the leader's incentives of adopting the intermediate technology invariant.
Our model can be seen to make a contribution to the analysis of optimal sequential investment behavior for firms facing multi-stage projects. This literature includes Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Dutta (1997) , Bhattacharya et al. (1986) , Grenadier and Weiss (1997) as well as Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) . However, these contributions all focus on industries with no strategic interactions between the firms. Relative to the existing literature the value added of the present analysis lies in the evaluation of how the presence of strategic interaction between future improved technology generations will impact on the adoption timing of a present, intermediate technology.
Our study proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present our general stochastic duopoly model of sequential technologies with the feature of strategic interaction between future and improved technologies. In Section 3 we characterize the upgrading of the intermediate technology. Section 4 characterizes the timing of adoption of the intermediate technology with a particular emphasis on how spillovers to the rival will impact on this timing. Finally, we offer some concluding comments in Section 5.
A Model of Strategic Adoption of an Intermediate Technology
Consider the strategic interaction between a firm with access to an intermediate technology, the leader (L), and a rival firm, the follower (F), with a potential to enter the market with a future improved version of the technology. Initially, the intermediate technology (I) generates a flow of revenues π I,0 L : R + → R. This revenue flow accruing to L depends on a stochastic state variable, which evolves over time according to a process to be specified below. Further, the experience accumulated through the adoption of the intermediate technology opens the option of updating the intermediate technology (I) to a superior and final technology (U). 
Consequently, L's adoption the intermediate technology initiates a Poisson process for both L and F with respect to the arrival date of the updated technology version and the intensity of this Poisson process is higher for L than for F so as to capture the natural feature that L is able to benefit from the intermediate technology to a higher extent than F . However, the stochastic nature of the arrival processes implies that it could perfectly well happen that F succeeds to adopt the updated technology earlier than L. Especially, we observe that
Consequently, we find that the closer is λ F to λ L , the closer the expected arrival dates are to each other. Analogously, the probability of the event that F adopts the updated technology earlier than L approaches 1/2, as λ F approaches λ L . In the limit where L does not stochastically dominate F with respect to the updating opportunity and
The joint probability distributions determining the expected order of adoption are presented in detail in Appendix A. At the moment of adopting the final technology the irreversible cost for F is given by c F . Again we assume L's experience with the intermediate technology to translate into an adoption cost advantage so that c L ≤ c F .
At each point in time the revenue flow is determined by the prevailing market structure. Firstly, we let π i,j L denote the revenue flow accruing to L when the state variable is x and when (i, j) summarizes the state of the technology such that i ∈ {I, U } indicates whether L makes use of the intermediate (I) or the updated technology (U ), whereas j ∈ {0, U } describes whether F has entered with the updated technology (U ) or whether it is still inactive (0). Secondly, we define π i,j F (x) as the revenue flow of F when the state variable is x and when now (i, j) summarizes the state of the technology such that i ∈ {0, U } indicates whether F has entered with the updated technology (U ) or whether it is still inactive (0), whereas j ∈ {0, U } delineates the technology adopted by L. In particular, π 
denotes the indicator (or characteristic) function of the set A. We make the following assumption regarding the relationship between the market structure and the revenue flows.
Assumption 2.1. For all x ∈ R + the following relationships hold:
Assumption (2.2) states the natural idea that the updated technology is superior to the intermediate technology in the sense that it yields higher monopoly revenues. Furthermore, successful adoption on behalf of the follower is assumed to burden the profits of the leader. Assumptions (2.3) and (2.4) formalize the notion that successful implementation of the updated technology yields competitive advantages. Assumption (2.5) means that the two rivals are symmetric in the product market in case they have both succeeded to implement the updated technology. In Assumption 2.1 the relationships (2.2) and (2.3) imply that there are first mover and second mover advantages, respectively. In line with, for example, Reinganum (1981) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) we assume the first mover advantages to dominate relative to the second mover advantages. This is formally expressed by Assumption 2.2. Define the mapping ∆ :
This mapping satisfies the inequality ∆(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, ∞).
Finally, throughout our study we require that the following assumption holds. This assumption implies, in particular, that the cash flow of a firm is increasing independently of the order at which the upgrading dates τ L and τ F are realized. It should, however, be emphasized that the order of the upgrading dates, τ L and τ F , will in an essential way affect the speed whereby the profit flows increase as functions of x.
We assume that the underlying state variable evolves according to a linear, time homogeneous, and regular diffusion process defined on the complete filtered probability space (Ω, P, {F t } t≥0 , F) and evolving on the state-space R + according to the dynamics described by the Itô-stochastic differential equation
where both the drift coefficient µ : R + → R and the diffusion coefficient σ : R + → R + are assumed to be sufficiently smooth for guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of a solution for the stochastic differential equation (2.7) (at least continuous, cf. Borodin and Salminen (1996) , pp. 46-47), and W (t) denotes standard Brownian motion. We assume that this process is independent of the adoption timings. In order to avoid interior singularities, we also assume that the diffusion coefficient σ(x) is positive, that is, we assume that σ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, ∞). Moreover, since we are not interested in potential default we further assume that the boundaries 0 and ∞ of the state-space are natural for the process X(t). Given the diffusion X(t), denote now as L 1 (R + ) the class of measurable mappings satisfying the absolute integrability condition (i.e the absence of speculative bubbles condition)
For any f ∈ L 1 (R + ) we define the functional R r f :
Moreover, it is well-known that given the assumptions of our study, there are two linearly independent fundamental solutions ψ(x) and ϕ(x) satisfying a set of appropriate boundary conditions based on the boundary behavior of the process X and spanning the set of solutions of the ordinary differential equation ((A − r)u)(x) = 0 (cf. Borodin and Salminen, pp. 18 -19). Moreover,
where B > 0 denotes the constant Wronskian of the fundamental solutions ψ(x) and ϕ(x) and
denotes the density of the scale function of X.
Upgrading of the Intermediate Technology
In order to derive an explicit representation of the real option value of the leader's opportunity to update its technology at τ L we have to derive the probability distributions characterizing the joint probability distributions of the dates τ L and τ F conditional on the order of success with respect to updating. Define the random variable
between the arrival dates of the upgraded technology. It is clear from our observations in the previous section that the expected difference
is increasing as a function of the intensity λ L and decreasing as a function of λ F . Moreover, from the joint probability distributions of the dates τ L and τ F and conditional on the order of updating success we find that
.
Consequently, we find that the expected duration of future monopoly benefits to the leader is an increasing function of the intensity λ L and a decreasing function of λ F . Similarly, we observe that the expected duration of duopolistic catch-up benefits for the leader given that the follower has upgraded his technology first is a decreasing function of λ L and an increasing function of λ F . Given the joint probability distributions of the arrival dates τ L and τ F and conditional on the order of updating success we find that the real option value can be expressed as
where elementary calculus can be applied to establish that
In (3.1) the term Γ L,1 measures the expected cumulative present value of the cash flow accruing to the leader given that the leader receives the upgraded technology prior to the follower and Γ L,2 measures the expected cumulative present value of the cash flow to the leader when the opposite happens. Given these operations, it can be shown that the real option value of the leader reads as
where ∆(x) > 0, as we have assumed the first mover advantages to dominate relative to the second mover advantages (Assumption 2.2). The assumed monotonicity of the cash flows imply that that the expected cumulative present value of the cash flow π L (t, x,τ ) is increasing (since expectation preserves ordering). Thus, the real option value V L (x) of the leader is increasing as a mapping of the current state x. It is also worth emphasizing that under our assumptions the classical resolvent equation
holds for all λ ∈ R + and f ∈ L 1 (R + ). Consequently, we find that the real option value V L (x) can be rewritten as
From (3.2) we can conclude that the real option value of the leader reads as
whenever λ F ↓ 0, that is, whenever the follower can never upgrade its technology. This real option value captures the sum of the current production potential (in terms of the current incumbent technology) and the expected cumulative present value associated with upgrading the incumbent intermediate technology, i.e., the expected cumulative present value of the first mover advantage (which is sure when λ F ↓ 0 since then the follower is never expected to upgrade). As is clear from (3.3), the real option value (3.4) can also be expressed as
L ))(x) Another important extreme case is that where the leader is expected to be able to instantaneously adopt the upgraded technology, that is, when λ L ↑ ∞. In that case the real option value of the leader reads as
The reason for this finding is obvious. If λ L ↑ ∞, the leader expects that the upgraded technology can be adopted immediately and, consequently, that the follower can never be first. Again, (3.3) implies that in this case the real option value (3.5) can also be rewritten as
. In order to characterize the comparative static properties of the real option value V L (x) more precisely, we first present the next auxiliary result:
Lemma 3.1. The real option value V L (x) is continuously differentiable with respect to the intensities λ L and λ F . Moreover, for all x ∈ R + we have
and
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3.1 establishes that an increase in the intensity λ L will unambiguously increase the value of the real option value V L (x). Similarly, Lemma 3.1 also establishes that an increase in the intensity λ F unambiguously decreases the option value V L (x).
Adoption of the Intermediate Technology
which incorporates the upgrading opportunity embedded in V L (x). Before presenting a set of necessary conditions under which the valuation problem (4.1) can be solved explicitly, we first state a set of generally valid conclusions characterizing the comparative statics of the value of the optimal adoption policy. In order to accomplish this task, we denote asĴ
the values in the presence of the intensityλ F satisfying the inequalitỹ λ F ≥ λ F . Our main results characterizing the comparative statics 1 of the value of the optimal adoption policy are now presented in
Proof. See Appendix C. Theorem 4.1 shows that the sign of the relationship between the intensity λ L and the value J L (x) is unambiguously positive under the conditions underlying this theorem. Thus, an improvement in the quality of the leader's updating option will increase the value of the embedded option associated with the intermediate technology. In a similar manner, by speeding up the arrival of the updated technology to the follower an increase in the upgrading intensity λ F impacts negatively on the option value of the intermediate technology to the leader, since the increased spillovers to the follower reduce the expected duration of monopoly profits.
In light of the well-known properties of the Poisson distribution the conclusions above can equally well be interpreted in terms of the uncertainty affecting the intensities of updating. More precisely, an increase in the intensity λ L decreases not only the expected arrival date of the updated technology, but it simultaneously decreases the variance λ −2 L and, thus, the uncertainty of the arrival of the updated technology. Consequently, an increase in the uncertainty of the firm-specific updating process will increase the option value of the intermediate technology. On the other hand, we can conclude that an increase in the uncertainty of the updating opportunities facing the rival will decrease the option value of the leader's intermediate technology. In fact, we can interpret this as a negative strategic impact of the uncertainty incorporated in the follower's updating opportunity on the option value of the leader's intermediate technology.
A set of generally satisfied sufficient conditions under which the optimal adoption problem is explicitly solvable is now formulated in the following.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that the mapping
Then, the optimal adoption date is τ (x * ) = inf{t ≥ 0 : X(t) ≥ x * } and the value of adopting the intermediate technology is
Especially,
and the value J L ∈ C 1 (R + ) ∩ C 2 (R + \{x * }) satisfies for x ∈ R + the variational inequalities
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 4.2 defines a set of sufficient conditions under which the optimal adoption problem has a unique solution. In order to develop an intuitive explanation of Theorem 4.2, assume that the leader decides to adopt the intermediate technology whenever the diffusion X(t) exceeds a given arbitrary state y ∈ R + implying that the adoption date is τ (y) = inf{t ≥ 0 : X(t) ≥ y}. The resulting value of such a policy is
The potential sub-optimality of this class of decision rules clearly implies that G(x, y) ≤ J L (x). Theorem 4.2 essentially specifies a set of conditions under which the value of adopting the intermediate technology can be expressed in terms of the auxiliary mapping G(x, y) as
Thus, the optimal value of adopting the intermediate technology can be attained by choosing that state at which G(x, y) is maximized as the adoption threshold. It is worth emphasizing that the ordinary first order condition G y (x, x * ) = 0 then implies the smooth-pasting condition
. In order to characterize the sign of the relationship between the updating intensities and the threshold x * at which the intermediate technology is optimally adopted, we now define the mapping
We can now establish the following:
Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix E. Corollary 4.3 presents a set of conditions under which we can unambiguously determine the sign of the relationship between the updating intensities and the threshold x * at which the intermediate technology is optimally adopted. Especially, we find that the sign of this relationship is essentially determined by the sensitivity of the mapping ∆(x) = V L (x)ψ(x) − V L (x)ψ (x) with respect to changes in the updating intensities. It is worth emphasizing that although the effect on the real option value V L (x) of a change in one of the updating intensities is known (from Lemma 3.1), the effect on the marginal value V L (x) is not known. The result of Corollary 4.3 dealing with the impact of an increase in λ L is illustrated in the following figure. 
Explicit Processes: An Illustration
In order to illustrate the general results incorporated in Theorem 4.2 we now focus on an environment where the stochastic process as well as the cash flows are made explicit. More precisely, we assume the conditions (A) and (B) to hold.
(A) The controlled process evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. This means that X(t) constitutes the solution of the stochastic differential equation It is well-known that under the circumstances defined by (A) and (B), we have that
provided that the absence of speculative bubbles condition (i.e. absolute integrability condition) r > δ(θ) = µθ + σ 2 θ(θ − 1)/2 is met. Similarly, we observe that
Consequently, we find that the real option value reads as
Standard differentiation of the multiplier A(θ, λ L , λ F ) with respect to the intensity λ L now yields that
by assumption. That is, increasing the intensity at which the updated technology can be adopted increases the real option value V L (x). Differentiating the multiplier A(θ, λ L , λ F ) now with respect to the intensity λ F yields
since it was assumed that a .2)). In other words, increasing the intensity λ F decreases the real option value V L (x). It is now an elementary exercise to establish that A(θ) can be rewritten as
which is positive by assumption. The value of the real investment opportunity to adopt the intermediate technology is now given by
Consequently, we have been able to establish the following.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that r > δ(θ). Then, the optimal investment date is τ * = inf{t ≥ 0 :
denotes the optimal investment threshold and
denotes the negative root of the characteristic equation
The value of the optimal policy reads as
where
denotes the positive root of the characteristic equation stated above.
Proof. The alleged result follows from Theorem 4.2.
From Theorem 4.4 we can immediately infer that ∂x * (λ L , λ F )/∂λ L < 0 from which we can conclude that an increase in the intensity λ L will decrease the optimal investment threshold and thereby speed up the adoption of the intermediate technology. Analogously, we find that ∂x * (λ L , λ F )/∂λ F > 0, which means that an improvement in the follower's ability to exploit the upgraded technology will raise the leader's threshold for investing into the intermediate technology. Thus, an improvement in the follower's ability to transform the intermediate technology into an improved technology will slow down the leader's adoption of the intermediate technology.
We summarize these properties in In light of Corollary 4.5 it is interesting to investigate iso-incentive curves defined by x * (λ L , λ F ) = K, where K > 0 is an arbitrary constant. Such iso-incentive curves describe the set of updating intensities (λ L , λ F ) which keep the adoption threshold constant. By substituting the definition of the iso-incentive curve into the definition of the optimal adoption threshold x * (λ L , λ F ) we find that the relationship
has to hold along the iso-incentive curve. Consequently, we find that the slope of the iso-incentive curve
because of (4.9) and (4.10). Thus, the iso-incentive curves are always positively sloped. This means that an increase in λ F has to be matched by an increase in λ L so as to keep the adoption threshold invariant. In fact, by comparing (4.9) and (4.10) we can conclude that the relative magnitudes of the partial derivatives A λF (θ, λ L , λ F ) and A λL (θ, λ L , λ F ) are essentially related to those of the catch-up benefit, a
L , and the loss to be caught-up, a
L . The form of the iso-incentive curves is illustrated in Figure 2 for moderately convex and in Figure  3 for strongly convex cash flows (under the assumptions that µ = 0.01 r = 0.05, σ = 0.1, a
, and k L = 1). Numerical experimentation indicates that the functional form of the iso-incentive curves are sensitive to θ, the convexity of the cash flows as functions of the state variable. The absence of speculative bubbles (r > δ(θ)) is equivalent to the condition that θ ∈ (η 2 , η 1 ). In the example illustrated by Figures 2 and 3 the admissible parameter interval is approximatively −3.70156 < θ < 2.70156. As illustrated by this example, the iso-incentive curves are concave on the set where the stochastic dominance condition λ L > λ F is satisfied. Thus, a growing increase in λ L is required to match an increase in λ F associated with more intense future competition in the form of a follower endowed with a higher updating intensity. However, as illustrated in Figure 3 , the shape of the iso-incentive curves changes drastically as the upper limit of the admissible set of parameters θ is approached. We summarize our findings regarding the iso-incentive curves in Theorem 4.6. The iso-incentive curves keeping the adoption threshold invariant are always positively sloped indicating that a higher updating intensity of a future competitor has to be matched by a higher updating intensity of the leader. Figure 2 : The iso-incentive curves when θ = 1.5
In his recent review of high-technology industries, Varian (2001) views versioning as a characteristic feature of these innovation intense industries. According to Varian business strategies based on versioning offer a mechanism for intertemporal discrimination. Versioning can also be viewed in light of the present model. Our analysis can be seen to have its focus on the following question. How are the incentives of adopting an intermediate technology related to the strategic relationship prevailing between the updating capabilities of competing firms in the product market? A high degree of exclusivity (in the sense of a low ν-ratio), which could be achieved, for example, through an auctioning mechanism like in the UMTS-auctions, implies adoption of a fairly premature intermediate technology characterized by a low upgrading intensity λ L . Thus, by inducing early adoption of intermediate technologies a high degree of exclusivity would promote versioning in the sense of prolonging the expected phase of intermediate technologies.
In light of this reasoning our model analytically captures the relationship between the degree of exclusivity incorporated in future technology generations and the timing of adoption of intermediate technology versions. Such a relationship seems to have clear implications for policies determining the intellectual property protection, like patent policy. Thus, our model could be seen to offer an analytical framework for how to evaluate patent policies in an intertemporal context which emphasizes the dynamics of technological progress through successive generations of improved technologies. In the present context we leave it for future studies to explore these policy implications in greater detail.
Concluding comments
In this study we have applied a real options approach to analytically characterize the option value of adopting an intermediate technology. We formally designed an asymmetric duopoly model to delineate how the optimal adoption timing of an intermediate technology depends on the embedded upgrading options available to the firm itself (the leader) and to its future rival (the follower). Focusing on diffusions we developed explicit representations demonstrating that the threshold of adopting an intermediate technology depends negatively (positively) on the leader's (follower's) upgrading intensity. We showed that an improvement in the quality of the leader's updating option will increase the value of the embedded option associated with the intermediate technology, whereas an increase in the follower's upgrading intensity was demonstrated to impact negatively. Furthermore, an increase in the uncertainty of the firm-specific updating process was proved to increase the option value of the intermediate technology, whereas the uncertainty incorporated in the follower's updating opportunity was shown to have a negative strategic impact on the option value of the leader's intermediate technology.
For the case of an underlying stochastic process following the geometric Brownian motion we explicitly characterized how competition taking place with respect to future technology generations will impact on the timing of adopting an intermediate technology. This was carried out in our analysis of the iso-incentive curves keeping the leader's incentives of adopting the intermediate technology invariant.
The present model can be used as a benchmark for important generalizations in several dimensions. Firstly, throughout the analysis the upgrading intensities have been assumed to be exogenous features of the model. Of course, in a more complete model of dynamic technology competition these updating intensities should result from optimizing investment decisions at each point in time. Such an extension would be particularly important for extensions focusing on implications for technology policy or intellectual property protection. The restriction to exogenous upgrading intensities might represent a much smaller loss of generality in contexts, like ours, emphasizing merely first approximations of the dynamics of technological progress through successive generations of improved technologies. Secondly, our model has admittedly represented an artificial short-cut as an analysis of strategic interaction insofar as it was restricted to a one-sided perspective. In this respect a complete analysis should focus on timing equilibria of games of strategic adoption of intermediate technologies where symmetric duopolists would have identical opportunities to adopt an intermediate technology. Such an approach would generate a theory of strategic compound options. In a world where we still do not have an well-established theory of strategic options such an approach would represent a highly ambitious research task.
A The joint probability densities
The assumed independence of the arrival dates of the upgraded technology implies that the joint (unconditional) distribution of the arrival dates is of the form λ L λ F e −λLτL−λF τF . Consequently, ordinary integration yields that the joint probability distributions of the dates τ L and τ F given that the order of the outcomes are known are:
The continuous differentiability of these distributions implies that the densities of these probability distributions can be expressed as
Given these densities, it now involves nothing but ordinary integration to establish that for any f ∈ L 1 (R + ), that is, for any cash flow f (x) having a finite expected cumulative present value, we have that E x e −rτL f (X τL ); τ L < τ F = λ L (R r+λL+λF f )(x),
and E x e −rτF f (X τF ); τ L > τ F = λ F (R r+λL+λF f )(x).
B Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. The continuous differentiability of the real option value V L (x) with respect to the intensities λ L and λ 
follows by monotone convergence. The proof of the second claim is analogous.
D Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Denote as J * L (x) the value of the proposed stopping strategy. Since the proposed stopping time τ * is admissible and
we have that J * L (x) ≤ J L (x). To prove the opposite inequality, we first observe that J * 
E Proof of Corollary 4.3
Proof. Since
On the other hand, implicit differentiation of the optimality condition V L (x * )ψ(
and that
The optimality of the threshold x * implies that V L (x * )ψ(x * ) < (V L (x * )−k L )ψ (x * ). Combining this expression with our assumptions completes the proof of the alleged results.
